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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
O·F THE STA T'E O·F UTAH 
ALBERT A. CECIL, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
La VERA C. CECIL, ELIZA C. BU·T-
TERFIELD, as Guardian of the 
person of La Vera C. Cecil, and 
WALKER BANK & TRUST COM-
pANY, a corporation, as Guardian 
of the Estate of La Vera C. Cecil, 
an Incompetent, 




STATEMENT OF FkCTS 
Respondent adopts Appellant's Statement of Facts 
excepting that wording which is patently argument. 
Since this cause sounds in equity, we append to Ap-
pellant's statement, for purposes of giving the Court ~ 
fuller picture, the following data: From November of 
1953, when Respondent and La \T era C. Cecil were di-
1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
vorced, until June of 1959, when Respondent learned 
of LaVera C. Cecil's January 1959 marriage to Darwin 
C. Richardson (R. 62) resp.ondent Albert A. Cecil paid, 
pursuant to the divorce decree herein $85.00 monthly to 
Walker Bank & Trust Company on behalf of La Vera 
C. Cecil as alimony. In June 1959 he was ap·parently one 
month in arrears on said payments (R. 66). Walker Bank 
& Trust Company, guardian of La Vera C. Cecil's estate, 
collected said monthly payments from Respondent for 
four months subsequent to January 1959, after it had 
learned of the January 6, 1959 marriage of La Vera C. 
Cecil to Darwin C. Richardson (R. 71). Neither the Bank 
nor Eliza C. Butterfield, the personal guardian of La-
V era C. ·Cecil, notified Respondent of the marriage (R. 
71). 
La Vera C. 'Cecil, at all times pertinent herein, lived 
apart from her guardian (R. 59); bought her own food 
and clothes (R. 63); contracted for her own lodgings 
(R. 64) ; made a trip by bus froin Salt Lake City, Utah, 
to Chicago, Illinois and return, unaccompanied (R. 60) ; 
and carried on social relationships of courtship Vlith 
members of the opposite sex (R. 51 and 62). She at no 
time required the personal services of her personal 
guardian (R. 63, 64), and the extent of the care given her 
by the guardian of her estate was apparently to give her 
a check periodically and to pay some doctor bills (R. 73). 
She was never declared insane. She was hospitalized 
in the State Hospital for treat1nent from May 10 to Oc-
tober 18, 1952, at which time she was released on a trial 
basis. She was given a final discharge therefrom in 
October, 1954 (R. 47). 
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Respondent knew nothing of the Cecil-Richardson 
1narriage nor was he advised of the annulment proceed-
ing (Court file #121299) until some time after the decree 
had been entered therein (R. 95). The annulment pro-
ceeding was not contested; it was virtually ex parte; no 
showing that the mental capacity of La Vera C. ·Cecil was 
tested is reflected in the record; no process or notice was 
served or posted therein, and counsel for Appellants 
prepared and took a written waiver and appearance in 
the action from Darwin C. Richardson, who was not 
otherwise rep-resented (R. 83) (See Appearance and 
Waiver. ~Court File #121299). Appellants and their 
counsel at all times pertinent herein knew the where-
abouts of Respondent but did not advise him either of the 
Cecil-Richardson marriage nor of the annulment p-ro-
ceeding ( R. 86 and 87). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON 
POINT I. 
THE JUDGMENT DECLARING THE LaVERA C. CECIL-
DARWIN RICHARDSON MARRIAGE NULL AND VOID IS 
NOT BINDING UPO·,N RESPONDENT. 
POINT II. 
THE FINDING OF THE COURT THAT LaVERA C. 
CECIL WAS COMPETENT TO MARRY ON JANUARY 6', 1·959 
IS IN FULL ACCORD WITH 1THE WEIGHT OF THE EVI-
DENCE AND THE LAW. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN TERMINATING ALI-
MONY, REGARDLESS OF THE VALIDITY OF THE JANU-
ARY 6, 1959 MARRIAGE, OR FOR ANY OTHER REASO·N. 
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POINT IV. 
THE JUDGMENT MODIFYING THE DECREE HEREIN 
AND THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN SUPPOR·T 




THE JUDGMENT DECLARING THE LaVERA C. CECIL-
DARWIN RICHARDSON MARRIAGE NULL AND VOID IS 
NOT BINDING UPON RESPONDENT. 
By reason of the marriage of La v' era C. Cecil on 
January 6, 1959 Respondent acquired a right of action 
to have the divorce decree modified to terminate alimony. 
Appellants seek to deprive Respondent of this right by a 
proceeding to which he was not a party and of which he 
had no knowledge. The general rule that a person cannot 
be deprived of a right of action in a proceeding in which 
he is not a party is clearly stated as follovvs: 
50 C.J.S. Judgments. Section 764: Persons having 
liens on or claims to property which was the sub-
ject matter of a former action, or having r~ghts 
of act~on against one or more of the partiJes there-
to are not bound by the judgment if they were not 
made parties to the suit, and had no right to be 
heard or to appeal from the judgn1ent, although 
their claims were brought into issue in such action, 
or although thevr riy hts ,depend on the same trans-
action or facts which were litigated. (Emphasis 
added.) 
And in 30 A. Am. Jur. Judgments, Section 395, the 
reasoning behind this doctrine is set forth: 
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The rule denying the right to apply the doctrine 
of res judicata as against strangers to a judgment 
is based upon obvious principles of justice. The 
reason for the rule lies in the fact that a stranger 
to an action does not have the opportunity, vouch-
safed to parties, to prove or ascertain the truth 
of the questions in issue, and the principle that 
no man's right should be prejudiced without an 
opportunity of defending it. 
Cases supporting this doctrine are legion. See: 
Taylor v. Barker, 70 Ut. 34, 262 P. 266; 
Federal Land Bank v. Pace, 87 Ut. 156, 48 P2 280 
Beach v. Faust, 31 P2 1060; 
Board of Commissioners of Denver v. Brettcher, 
63 P2 477; 
Hovey v. Bradbury, 44 Pac. 1077. 
Appellants rely heavily upon Hilton v. Snyder, 37 
Ut. 384, 108 P. 698. This was an action to recover dower. 
Plaintiff sought to establish her marriage to Defendant, 
who was then deceased, by introducing judgments in two 
prior actions in which the status of her marriage to him 
had been affirmed. Appellate court upheld the ruling of 
the trial court, which precluded the judgments in the 
prior actions from being introduced as evidence of the 
marriage. The main holding in HiJlton v. Snyder, supra, 
therefore, is contra to Appellant's position. Statements 
quoted by Appellants from that case are, at most, dicta. 
In discussing the kinds of judgments which are bind-
ing on the world the Court, in the Hilton case, supra, 
referred to statutory proceedings whereby status may be 
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determined and in which special notice to the public 1~ 
required. Of the importance of notice the court said: 
But even where status may be determined by 
some special proceeding, notice thereof is usually 
provided for which must be given to some desig-
nated public official, or to the public generally, by 
publication or the like. In this way the public 
generally may be saiJd to have been brought into 
court, and for that reason may be bound by the 
judgment, for certain p1~;rposes at least. (Empha-
sis ours.) 
However, the ·Court stated that it knew of no statute out-
lining such procedure in the State of Utah. The Court 
then stated, on page 699: 
In cases beween individuals, ho"\vever, where the 
status is merely incidentally in issue, a judgment, 
which, among other things, also fixes the status 
of one or both parties, is not admissible as evi-
dence of that fact as against strangers to that 
judgment. . . . As "\\Te understand the rule which 
distinguishes a status from any other element in a 
case, it is this : If an action, although prosecuted 
by one individual against another, is instituted for 
the sole purpose of changing or declaring the 
status of either one or both of the parties to the 
action, then, in the absence of fraud or collusion 
in obtaining the judgment, it is binding upon all 
the world as well as the parties and their privies. 
But, if the status is Inerely incidentally involved, 
the judgment, although fixing the status of either 
or both parties, is not admissible as against 
strangers as evidence of the status. 
In order for a judgment then to be binding upon 
the world, according to Hilton v. Snyder, supra, in addi-
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tion to proper notice being given, the action must be in-
stituted for the sole purpose of changing the status of a 
party to the action and must be free from fraud and 
collttsion. The judgment of annulment in question meets 
neither of these requirements. The sole purpose of the 
annulment action, rather than to change the status of the 
parties, was to preserve the right of alimony of LeV era 
C. Cecil: 
La Vera Cecil herself asked Mr. Richards, counsel for 
the Bank, about a divorce (R. 77). Richards testified 
that a divorce could be had (R. 82), but decided on the 
annulment "to p.rotect the estate and l\{rs. Cecil's rights" 
to the alimony (R. 78, 82). We quote from the Richards 
testimony (R. 82) commencing at line 26: 
Q. Now if you succeeded in having the marriage 
annulled so that it was void ab initio, you 
would safeguard that $85.00 a month pay-
ment, wouldn't you~ 
A. That's correct. I figured that I would save 
her and give her something to live on the rest 
of her life instead of the public. 
Q. And that honestly was the basis of your de-
cision (to take the annulment rather than 
the divorce route) wasn't it, you 'van ted to 
safeguard that money~ 
A. Well. I wanted to protect her estate; yes, 
certainly. 
Q. It wasn't that there was any difficulty in get-
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Status was of no concern to Mrs. Cecil or to her 
·counsel Mr. Richards except as it was deemed important 
to Mr. Richards in his attempts to perpetuate alimony. 
The Cecil-Richardson 1narriage occurred on J anu-
ary 6, 1959; the annulment proceeding was commenced 
in mid-June, 1959. During this interval of some five 
months the chief concern of Appellants and their counsel 
was the preservation of La Vera C. Cecil's claim to alimony 
against Respondent (R. 83). During this period of "con-
cern" the Guardian of the estate accepted alimony pay-
ments fro1n Respondent; and although La \T era C. ·Cecil 
and her personal guardian and the guardian of her estate 
knew of the whereabouts of the Respondent and of his 
interest in the matter, they refused to notify him of the 
marriage or of the annulment action. Respondent was 
not made a party to the annulment action, nor did he 
know of the pendency thereof. Richardson was never 
served with process, did not contest the action, and was 
not present at the time of the hearing. Indeed, counsel 
for Appellants took his Waiver and Appearance, in the 
action. 
The foregoing is persuasive of collusion and indi-
cates an effort on the part of Appellants to do secretly 
that which they feared "\vould not stand the scrutiny of 
full disclosure. The legal effect of collusion in such cases 
is "\Yell stated in Henley v. Faster, 220 Ala. 420, 125 So. 
662, a case involving the rights of a child where her 
parents had obtained a decree of annulment of their 
1narriage by collusion : 
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rrhird persons, however, not parties to the suit, 
but whose equitable or legal rights are affected by 
the status arising from a collusive or fraudulent 
decree, may, in a wide range of cases, challenge 
the same in equity. As it was well said in a 
T'ennessee case, a collusive and fraudulent decree 
between husband and wife is no more effective as 
to the property rights of third persons than a 
fraudulent deed between them. 
Although the Court, in Hilton v. Snyder, supra, did 
not specifically mention the necessity of an "adversary 
proceeding" it did seem imperative that such must be a 
requirement. Indeed, to be free from fraud and collusion 
the proceeding should be adversary. If a judgment is to 
achieve the status of being binding upon the world and 
particularly on one who, as in this case, had a valuable 
right affected by the action, opportunity to test the truth 
of the allegations should have been afforded him-all of 
which was lacking here. 
Appellants assume that an annulment proceeding is 
In rem and categorically binding, therefore, upon the 
world. Actually, the most that can be said of an annul-
ment action is that it partakes of the nature of an in rem 
proceeding: 30 Am. J ur. Judgments, Section 127: 
A judgment rendered in an action, the primary 
purpose of which is to fix the status of individuals 
or entities, is frequently spoken of as a judgment 
in rem or in the nature of an in rem action. 
An action in some particulars binding upon the world 
and thereby partaking of an in rem nature may, as here, 
not bind or adjudicate certain collateral matters or rights 
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of persons not parties. Exa1nples of this are seen in 
divorce cases, ordinarily in rem proceedings, but leaving 
for further determination certain rights of third persons. 
Thus it was held in Rediker v. Rediker ('Calif.) 221 P2 
1: 
As between the parties or their priVIes, a 
decree of divorce is res judicata, not only of their 
status with relation to each other, but also of all 
issues that were litigated or that could have been 
litigated therein; but as between strangers and 
parties, the decree is res judicata only in that it 
conclusively determines that the parties are there-
after free to remarry so far as .any relation to 
each other is concerned. A decree of divorce is a 
judgment in rem only to the extent that it adjudi-
cates the future status of the parties in relation 
to each other as distinguished from their pre-
existing st.atus. 
Findings of fact cannot be rnade binding on 
a stranger to the action by calZ.-£ng the proceeding 
"~n rem." 
The rights of an innocent second spouse or 
the children of a second marriage are not di-
minished by the findings of fact in a proceeding 
to which they were not parties and in "\vhich they 
had no right to be heard. Such a holding would 
not only be unreasonable, but constitutionally ob-
jectionable. 
Respondent further asserts the decree of annuln1ent 
is void on its face because it "\vas granted "\Yhere no statu-
10 
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tory ground existed: Title 30-1-2, Utah Code Annotated 
1.953 reads: 
MARRIAGES PROHIBITED AND 
DECLARED VOID: 
(1) With an idiot or lunatic, etc. 
This is the only provision applicable, although there 
are seven statements of prohibition relating to incestuous, 
interracial and other marriages in the statute cited. 
La Vera C. Cecil at no time pertinent herein was 
nor is she now either an idiot or a lunatic. Dr. ~1:oench 
testified that her I.Q. was 80 to 85 and the I.Q. of an 
idiot is 50 to 60 (R. 49). In the petition in the guardian-
ship proceedings in 1953, (No. 36053, 3rd District ~court, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah) it was asserted only 
that she was incompetent and unable to manage her prop-
erty; see Petition for Appointment of Guardian, Civil 
No. 36053. She was committed to the State Hospital for 
treatment and released prior to the filing of the petition. 
She entered the hospital 1fay 10, 1952, was released on 
a trial basis five months later on October 18, 1952, and 
finally discharged therefrom in October, 1954 (R. 47). 
She was never at any time adjudged insane. 
In order to have declared the marriage void, not 
merely voidable, the court must have found, in this in-
stance, that she \vas an idiot or lunatic, terms having 
equivalent meanings. l\1ere mental incompetence is not 
a ground for annulment in Utah. 
11 
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Implicit in the divorce proceedings herein and the 
guardianship proceedings referred to above is that the 
chief concern of all persons involved at the time of the 
incompetency hearing was to be able to pass title to the 
real p·rop·erty owned by the parties, without any question 
of legal capacity on LaVera Cecil's part. Her mental 
status or competency per se, were not of moment apart 
from the problem of title to the property. 
Reference is made under this point to the law dis-
cussed in detail at point II post, in connection with the 
mental capacity requisite to marry. 
Additionally, the annulment proceeding is void on 
its face, in that the action was brought by the personal 
guardian rather than by one of the parties to the mar-
riage. The Court therefore acquired no jurisdiction. 
The Utah statute is as follows: 
30-1-17, Utah Code Annotated, 1953: AVOID-
ANCE OR AFFIR~1AN·CE IN COURT OF 
EQUITY: When doubt is felt as to the validity of 
a marriage, either party 1nay in a court of equity, 
demand its avoidance or affirmance ... 
We have found no case in Utah construing the fore-
going statute in this regard. \"""irtually the same statute 
is found in the State of l\faine, ,,,.hich reads as follows: 
vVhen the validity of a Inarriage is doubted either 
party may file a libel as for divorce: and the 
court shall decree the annuln1ent or affirmance 
according to the proof. (Revised Statutes of 
Maine, Chapter 60, Par. 18.) 
12 
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The wording here is virtually identical in its opera-
tive parts as ours. A case construing the Maine statute 
is Winslow v. Tray, 53 Atlantic 1008: 
IIELD: Where a Guardian was the petitioner the 
petition gave the Court no jurisdiction, on the 
premise that it was the petition of the Guardian 
and not that of the husband. . . . The statute f-:ays 
that either party may file a libel as for divorce. 
Here neither party to the marriage filed the libel; 
the decree was made upon the libel or petition 
of the guardian only. Upon this ground, there-
fore, the court had no jurisdiction to annul the 
marriage and the decree was void. 
And in Pence v. Aughe, 101 Indiana 317, a suit by a 
guardian to annul a marriage on the ground that his 
incompetent was not capable of entering into the mar-
riage, the court said : 
This latter section of the statute is the only one, 
so far as we are advised, that authorizes such a 
suit or proceeding (annulment on account of in-
sanity or idiocy) as the one at bar; and, in the 
absence of such statutory provisions, it is very 
certain we think, that no such suit or proceeding 
could be maintained. Under these statutory pro-
visions the question arises, and, in so far as the 
sufficiency of the complaint is concerned, this is 
the controlling question in this case: can such a 
suit or proceeding be instituted or maintained by 
or in the name of any person, other than the per-
son specified in the statute as "The Incapable 
Party'' : We are of the opinion that this question 
must be answered in the negative. 
13 
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POINT II. 
THE FINDING OF THE COURT THAT LaVERA C. 
CECIL WAS COMPETENT TO MARRY ON JANUARY 6-, 1'959 
IS IN FULL ACCOR.D WITH 1THE WEIGHT OF THE EVI-
DENCE AND THE LAW. 
La.Vera C. Cecil was never adjudicated insane 
as contended by counsel. Hence, argument that such 
adjudication is prima facie proof of unsoundness of 
mind at the time of her marriage is of no weight. Nor 
does a guardianship created because a person lacks 
mental competence to deal with her property, as here, 
create any barrier to marriage. 
Two Utah cases, Hatch v. Hatch, 46 U. 218, and 
0' Reilly v. McLean, 84 U. 551, in interpreting our In-
competent Persons statute, 75-13-20 U.C.A. 1953, former-
ly 102-13-20 hold that this statute does not alter the ordin-
ary test of contractual capacity which is "whether party 
contracting had sufficient mental faculties to understand 
the subject, nature, and consequence of the contract.'' 
·Counsel's reference to 29 Am. Jur. Par. 67 on Insane 
Persons and their ability to contract is therefore inappli-
cable. 
Under Utah marriage laws there is no prohibition 
of marriage because a party is under a guardianship. 
At common law, persons under guardianship could marry 
and the general rule was that the n1arriage of a n1ale 
ward terminated the guardianship of his person but not 
of his estate, "\vhile the 1narriage of a female "\Yard terini-
nated the guardianship entirely. (28 ·C.J., Guardianship, 
1097, WOERNER, GUARDIANSHIP 33-l- et seq.) 
14 
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We will treat the two subheadings suggested by 
counsel's brief, although not so designated therein, as 
follows: 
1. Effect of pr1or adjudication of incompetency 
on a person's present ability to marry. 
2. General mental capacity requisite to a valid 
rnarr1age. 
1. Re: Effect of p,r1or adjudication of incolnpet-
ency: 55 C.J .S. Section 12: 
One for whom a guardian, committee or curator 
has been appointed is not necessarily incapable of 
contracting marriage; it depends on whether or 
not he has the mental capacity to contract mar-
riage. 
Among the cases cited in support of this view 1s 
Roether v. Roether, W,isconsin, 191 N.W. 576. The case 
is reported in 28 A.L.R. 631 as the basic case in an anno-
tation entitled "Mental Capacity to l\{arry.'' The case 
holds that where the defendant had been adjudged an 
incompetent, and a guardian for his person and estate 
appointed, which guardianship \vas in existence at the 
time of his marriage, he was not incapacitated from 
1narrying on that account. Also, in Banker v. Banker, 63 
N.Y. 409, it was held: 
Where a man has been adjudged of unsound mind, 
and afterwards while under guardianship con-
tracts a marriage, it does not seem, independently 
of statute, that this is proof of a \Vant of mental 
capacity to contract the marriage. 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The law seems clear that in the absence of statute 
prohibiting a ward of a guardianship from marrying, the 
guardianship per se is no bar. 
2. Re: General mental capacity requisite to a valid 
marriage. 
At 35 Am. Jur. Section 18, under the heading: Tests 
of Existence of Capacity in Creation of the JM~arital Stat-
us or Relationship, we read: 
It may be stated generally that no greater, if as 
much, mental capacity is requisite to make binding 
a matrimonial contract than is requisite for ordi-
nary business contracts. It has been frequently 
laid down broadly that mental incapacity to enter 
into a marriage exists whenever there is such 
mental incapacity as to disable one from entering 
into contracts generally or as to disable one from 
understanding the contract, its nature and prob-
able consequences, but ... marriage depends to a 
great extent on sentiment, attachment and affec-
tion which persons with weaker, as well as those 
with stronger, intellects feel, and it does not de-
pend to the extent that ordinary contracts do on 
the exercise of clear reason, discernment and 
sound judgment. It is accordingly held by some 
authorities that a person may have sufficient 
mental capacity to contract a valid marriage al-
though he may not have mental capacity to con-
tract generally. 
In the Roether case, supra, it was held: "A marriage 
by one having understanding and mental capacity to re-
alize what is then being done and consenting thereto i~ 
valid." 'Tinje, Chief Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court, in delivering the opinion of the Court in the case 
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and, after discussing at length the capacity to marry 
said: 
Applying these rules of law to the present case, 
we find that the inquiry narrows down to the 
establishinent of the fact that whether or not ... 
when the 1narri,age with plaintiff took place, the 
defendant had mental capacity sufficvent to 
understand the nature of the contract and con-
sent thereto. (Emphasis ours.) 
It is the italicized portion of the above which counsel 
read to Dr. L. G. Moench at the trial as the final question 
with respect to La Vera ~Cecil's mental capacity to enter 
into the marriage. (R. 52) 
Q. I'm going to ask you the final definitive ques-
tion: When La Vera C. Cecil stood in Elko 
with Darwin Richardson before the Justice 
of the Peace, do you believe . . . I am now 
reading from a book . . . "when the marriage 
took place, do you believe she had mental 
capacity sufficient to understand the nature 
of the contract of marriage and that she con-
sen ted thereto f' 
A. (Dr. L. G. Moench) Yes, I think she did. 
This was the last question and answer on cross ex-
amination. Mr. Richards on re-direct asked these ques-
tions and received these answers: 
Q. Now, Doctor, when you state that she had 
mental competency to understand the nature 
of the marriage, do you mean by that that she 
just understood that she was getting married 
or that she understood all of the complica-
tions and involvements of a married life and 
her financial support and so forth~. 
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A. She understood some of the complications, 
at least she reviewed with me some of the 
things she thought of at that time. I think 
she knew she was getting married and she 
knew there were some complications of get-
ting married. She reviewed the financial 
position of the second husband. She revi,ewed 
hvs work recor.d or lack of work record, his 
pension and things like that. 
Q. And do you think she understood fully those 
situations~ 
A. No sir, I don't think she understood fully. 
I don't think any of us do, if I may ... 
(Emphasis added.) 
Dr. Moench was the expert relied upon by Appel-
lants for opinion that La Vera Cecil was not competent 
to marry. He gave that opinion on direct examination 
in answer to counsel's leading question: 
Q. Now I believe in your opinion that you stated 
that from 1952 on that she would not be com-
petent~ 
A. Yes, in my opinion. (Lines 13, 14, 15, R. 48) 
But the Doctor, in resp·onse to questions from coun-
sel on cross examination and from the Court, revealed 
it was his opinion that standards higher than those re-
quired by the law should be applied to candidates for 
marriage. 
His definitive answer to Respondent's definitive 
question, as reported in full above, that La Vera Cecil 
had mental capacity to understand the nature of the 
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contraet of marriage and that she consented thereto 
~hould be sufficient to guide us here. 
~ince the evidence is reviewable here, we refer brief-
ly to these data which were undoubedly as persuasive 
upon the trial court as the Doctor's opinion: 
1. At no time since the guardianship did La Vera 
C. Cecil apparently require the guidance or assistance 
of her personal guardian. (See all of Butterfield Testi-
mony, particularly: 
As far as knowing anything about what she 
did, I didn't know. (Lines 28, 29, R. 57) 
Q. Did she ever follow your advice or direction 
since your being appointed guardian~ 
A. No, she always did as she pleased. (R. 58) 
She has always lived away from me. (Line 
29, R. 59) 
Mr. Ronnow: Well Mrs. Butterfield, from 1953 in 
the fall when you were appointed her per-
sonal guardian until today, you don't buy her 
food or clothes or take care of her, do you~ 
The vVitness: No. I do not. (Lines 24-29, R. 63) 
I have never bothered her. I have let her do 
just as she pleased. ( R. 64) ) 
2. She lived alone at various hotels or rooming 
houses. She contracted for these lodgings unaided by her 
personal guardian or the bank. (R. 63-64) She bought 
her own food and clothing and other necessaries, un .. 
aided. 
3. She made a trip alone to Chicago, Illinois and re-
turn from Salt Lake City. Her mother and personal 
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j 
guardian, Mrs. Butterfield, "had no real concern that 
she was going to get hurt or anything like that" on the 
trip. (R. 60) 
4. She carried on a courtship with Richardson for 
four months prior to marrying him, during which time 
she reviewed his financial condition, his work record and 
his pension. (R. 51, 52) 
5. She philosophised that marrying Richardson 
might erase a sense of religious guilt she felt from having 
lived with him on a sexual basis. (R. 51) 
6. In Elko, at the time of her marriage, she had 
"some question in her mind as to whether or not she 
should get married." She studied this and decided she 
would get married. (R. 52) She consented to the marri-
age of her own volition. 
7. Her quarrels with Walker Bank and Trust Com-
pany over money and her stories of lost purses, etc. (R. 
68) in order to get them to give her more money suggest 
intelligent planning and craft as much as the juvenile 
attitude Ap·pellants contend for. 
She was mentally comp·etent to contract, she kne'v 
and understood what she was doing when she married 
Richardson, and the guardianship is no bar. 
POINT III. 
THE CO'URT DID NOT ERR IN TERMINATING ALI-
MONY, REGARDLESS OF THE VALIDITY OF THE JANU-
ARY 6, 1959 MARRIAGE, OR FOR ANY OTHER REASO·N. 
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In .A.ustad v. Austad, 2 Ut. 2d 49, 269 P2 284, cited by 
Appellants for authority that the payments of alimony 
should continue, notwithstanding the validity of the mar-
riage of La \r era 'C. Cecil, our Supreme Court has decreed 
that "the burden would be upon the wife to prove'' that 
the termination of alimony would be "so unconscionable 
or inequitable that the court ... would decree that (she) 
does not lose her right to alimony upon remarriage." 
That burden simply has not been borne here. We 
have no testimony whatever from La Vera C. Cecil and 
very little from others as to whether or not an ''uncon-
scionable or inequitable" result would obtain. 
The Austad case has been the subject of an annota-
tion to be found at 48 A.L.R. 2d 256. The weight of opin-
ion therein seems best exp-ressed in Cary v. Cary, a Con-
necticut case, rep·orted at 152 Atl. 302. In the Cary 
case the 'Court said: 
The better rule which we adopt, save in the most 
exceptional circumstances, draws fro1n the volun-
tary action of the wife in re-marrying the infer-
renee that she has elected to obtain her support 
from her second husband and has thereby aban-
doned the previous mate for her support by the 
court in its awarding of alimony. Gases admit-
ting of a variance of this r~tle will be except~onal 
and rare and the burden of removing the case 
from the ordinary rule is upon the wife, if the 
proof of the re-marriage has been made. Reason 
requires us to hold that the re-marriage of the 
wife should relieve the husband of supporting the 
wife of another man. (Emphasis added.) 
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We refer the court to finding Number 6 of the trial 
Judge wherein he describes in detail that he sees no in-
equitable result and that the equities favor Respondent. 
(R. 101-102) 
POINT IV. 
THE JUDGMENT MODIFYING THE DECREE HER.EIN 
AND THE FINDINGS. AND CONCLUSIONS IN SUPPORT 
THEREOF ARE IN KEEPING WITH THE EVIDENCE AND 
THE LAW. 
The Judgment of modification, findings and con-
clusions in support thereof are in keeping with the evi-
dence and the law, as we believe has been shown in the 
argument covering Points I, II, and III. 
CONCLUSION 
Upon the remarriage of LaVera ·C. Cecil, Respond-
ent had the clear right, in Equity, to have the divorce 
decree modified to provide for the termination of ali-
mony payments. Had he learned of the marriage prior 
to the annulment decree he would have been successful 
in a hearing to have this decree modified, even in the 
face of the defense of invalidity of the marriage. This 
seems clear from the result in the case at bar. 
Appellants would deprive him the right to test the 
validity of the marriage by prosecuting a furtive an-
nulment proceeding, which they choose to call an in rem 
action, in an effort to cut off Respondent's rights. The 
action was not one in rem as shown herein, nor did 
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Appellants' procedure comport with the rigid require-
ments of Equity, whose blessing they now invoke. 
Clean hands are Respondent's, not Appellants. The de-
cree of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROMNEY, BOYER and RO,NNOW 
Attorneys for Plaintiff a;nd 
Respondent 
1409 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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